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OIL AND GAS AND FLOODS
Justin Pidot *
INTRODUCTION
On March 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez oil tanker ran aground
on Bligh Reef.' Over the next five hours, the incapacitated vessel
spilled more than ten million gallons of crude oil into Alaska's
Prince William Sound, and some of that oil remains in the envi-
ronment to this day.2
Reaction to the Exxon Valdez disaster was swift. Congress con-
vened its first hearing on the incident on April 6, 1989," and
passed the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA") less than two years
later with broad bipartisan support-the House of Representa-
tives passed the bill 375 to 5 and the Senate passed the bill on a
voice vote.' The federal government did not act alone. The State of
Alaska promptly convened an oil spill commission to examine the
Exxon Valdez spill, which published a lengthy report less than a
* Assistant Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. I would like to
thank Amanda Leiter, Nancy Leong, Lisa Grow Sun, and Annecoos Wiersema for their
help with this article and the University of Richmond Law Review for inviting me to par-
ticipate in the 2013 Allen Chair Symposium.
1. Stephen Raucher, Raising the Stakes for Environmental Polluters: The Exxon Val-
dez Criminal Prosecution, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 147, 147 (1992).
2. Amy J. Wildermuth, The Legacy of the Exxon Valdez: How Do We Stop the Crisis?,
7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 130, 130 (2009).
3. Topics Concerning the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill into the Prince William Sound of
Alaska: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard & Navigation of the H. Comm. on
Merch. Marine & Fisheries, 101st Cong. 1 (1989).
4. Oil Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990); Anne C.
Mulkern, How Long to Pass an Oil Spill Bill? Try 18 Months, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/12/12greenwire-how-long-to-pass-an-oil-spill-bill-
try-18-mont-13939.html. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 is not without its flaws, and some
commentators view the duration of congressional debate as excessive. See Browne Lewis,
It's Been 4380 Days and Counting Since Exxon Valdez: Is It Time to Change the Oil Pollu-
tion Act of 1990?, 15 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 97, 107-09 (2001); Mulkern, supra; see also
JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33705, OIL SPILLS IN U.S. COASTAL
WATERS: BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 9-12 (2010) (discussing
provisions of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990).
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year later with numerous recommendations for reform.' Private
parties also got into the act. Media personalities called for a boy-
cott of Exxon.' Response to the disaster was also long-lasting.
Even two decades later, scholars continue to study the causes and
effects of the spill.'
Another spill of a similar magnitude took place almost twenty
years after the Exxon Valdez, but that incident received very dif-
ferent treatment. On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina buffet-
ed the Gulf Coast.' The storms devastated communities along the
coast and riveted the national attention.9 Close to two thousand
people died, a million more were displaced, and the damage from
the storm measured over $100 billion.o Hurricane Katrina also
wreaked havoc on the oil industry: it destroyed or damaged more
than sixty oil platforms and one hundred pipelines, and affected
nine major oil refineries." All told, estimates are the hurricane
caused releases of more than eight million gallons of oil in at least
ten major spills."
Hurricane Katrina captured the attention of policymakers and
the public, but little of this attention focused on the massive oil
spills resulting from the storm. Indeed, one of the few talking
5. See ALASKA OIL SPILL COMM'N, SPILL: THE WRECK OF THE EXXON VALDEZ 129-71
(1990), available at http://www.arlis.org/docs/voll/B/33339870.pdf.
6. Radio Hosts Urging Exxon Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1989, at Dl.
7. The Alaska Sea Grant, for example, hosted a conference to examine the Exxon
Valdez spill on its twentieth anniversary. See Exxon Valdez Oil Spill 20th Anniversary:
EVOS and Alaska Sea Grant-People, Process, and Progress, ALASKA SEA GRANT (Mar.
2009), http://seagrant.uaf.edulconferences/2009/evos-anniversary/; see also, e.g., Zygmunt
J.B. Plater, Learning from Disasters: Twenty-One Years after the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill,
Will Reactions to the Deepwater Horizon Blowout Finally Address the Systemic Flaws Re-
vealed in Alaska?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 104, 104 (2010).
8. Joseph B. Teaster & Kate Zernike, Hurricane Slams into Gulf Coast; Dozens Are
Dead, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at Al.
9. See, e.g., Lisa Grow Sun, Disaster Mythology and the Law, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1131, 1140 (2011).
10. Andy Newman, Comparing Hurricanes: Katrina v. Sandy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2012, at A28.
11. ROBERT L. BAMBERGER & LAWRENCE KUMINS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22233,
OIL AND GAS: SUPPLY ISSUES AFTER KATRINA 5-6 (2005); Press Release, Minerals Mgmt.
Serv., Impact Assessment of Offshore Facilities from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Jan.
19, 2006), available at http://www.boem.gov/boem-newsroom/press-releases/2006/press
0119.aspx. Many oil refineries that provide a significant share of the nation's refined pe-
troleum were either shut down before the storm or temporarily shut down after.
BAMBERGER & KUMINS, supra, at 1.
12. Betsy McKay, Polluted Options: Katrina Oil Spill Clouds Future of Battered Sub-
urb, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2006, at Al (citing figures according to the United States Coast
Guard).
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points that emerged about oil and Hurricane Katrina was patent-
ly false. A series of politicians, including Kentucky Senator Mitch
McConnell, Secretary of the Interior Dirk Kempthorne, and Loui-
siana Governor Bobby Jindal, supported expanding off-shore oil
drilling with the claim that, as former Mississippi Senator Trent
Lott put it, "We didn't have one drop of oil spilt when we had the
biggest hurricane in, you know, recent history, Hurricane Katri-
na."" The Wall Street Journal's editorial page echoed the claim:
"Hurricanes Katrina and Rita flattened terminals across the Gulf
of Mexico but didn't cause a single oil spill."" Reality belies these
claims, and yet they passed with little fanfare.
The nation reacted to Hurricane Katrina and the Exxon Valdez
oil spill, each releasing similar amounts of oil into the environ-
ment, in dramatically different fashions." The Exxon Valdez oil
spill, the largest experienced by the United States at that time,
led to new federal law, swift state action, and public outcry. The
Hurricane Katrina oil spill, the second largest experienced by the
United States at that time, led to indifference. Part of the expla-
nation is, of course, that Hurricane Katrina was dramatically
multifaceted. News outlets had their hands full reporting on myr-
iad issues, including living conditions within the New Orleans
Superdome," the incompetent response of the federal govern-
ment," the failure of government-constructed levees designed to
13. See David Morgan, "Not One Drop of Oil Spilled"? Not Quite, CBSNEWS.COM (July
19, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/not-one-drop-of-oil-spilled-not-quite/.
14. Editorial, $4 Gasbags, WAIL ST. J., June 12, 2008, at A16; see also Frank Ahrens,
Oil Doesn't Want Focus on Big Profit; Companies Stepping Up Advertising, WASH. POST,
Oct. 26, 2005, at D1 (indicating that the president of the American Petroleum Institute
claimed no oil spills from Hurricane Katrina or Rita).
15. If the oil released after Hurricane Katrina is considered in combination with that
released after Hurricane Rita, which struck the Gulf Coast a month later, the amount of
oil released into the environment exceeds that released by the Exxon Valdez spill. See
RAMSEUR, supra note 4, at 1-2. The now-defunct Mineral Management Service estimated
that the hurricanes led to the release of eight million gallons of oil from aboveground stor-
age facilities, 600,000 gallons from oil platforms and pipelines, and 3.3 million gallons
from a tank barge. Id. at 2.
16. See, e.g., Ann Gerhart, 'And Now We Are in Hell', WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 2005, at
Al.
17. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Democrats and Others Criticize White House's
Response to Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at A16; Susan B. Glasser & Josh White,
Storm Exposed Disarray at the Top, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at Al.
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protect New Orleans," and complicated issues of race relations
revealed by the nation's experience of the storm."
I suspect, however, that more than the sheer number of issues
raised by Hurricane Katrina contributed to the lack of public and
political response to this dramatic release of oil into the environ-
ment. Building oil platforms, pipelines, refineries, storage tanks,
and the like along a coastline consistently battered by hurricanes
inevitably leads to oil spills. Indeed, just the year before Hurri-
cane Katrina, Hurricane Ivan also caused oil spills, including one
that continues to this day.20 Yet to acknowledge that fact requires
society to acknowledge the role that human behavior plays in cre-
ating natural disasters. In the words of Phil O'Keefe and his col-
leagues in a 1976 Nature article, "[w]ithout people there is no
disaster."" That truth, however, is inconvenient because fully ac-
cepting its weight demands new thinking about development
within natural hazard zones, something which society has long
resisted.
This symposium article has three goals. First, it seeks to draw
attention to the pressing risks that natural disasters pose to en-
ergy infrastructure. It focuses on one type of natural disaster-
flooding-and one variety of energy infrastructure-oil and natu-
ral gas. Natural disasters do not, however, discriminate and also
pose broad risks to energy systems of all stripes. Second, the arti-
cle seeks to provide examples of existing federal and state legal
regimes that address to some extent the dangers floods pose to
the oil and gas industry. As we shall see, the regulatory regimes I
address are sparse and hardly comprehensive. Third and finally,
the article seeks to provide preliminary thoughts about the rea-
sons that regulation of oil and gas development in flood-prone lo-
cales has historically favored development.
18. See, e.g., Scott Shane & Eric Lipton, Government Saw Flood Risk but Not Levee
Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2005, at Al.
19. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Broken Levees, Unbroken Barriers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4,
2005, § 4, at 1; Lynne Duke & Teresa Wiltz, A Nation's Castaways; Katrina Blew in, and
Tossed up Reminders of a Tattered Racial Legacy, WASH. POST, Sept. 4, 2005, at D1.
20. See Mark Schleifstein, Taylor Energy Oil Platform, Destroyed in 2004 During
Hurricane Ivan, Is Still Leaking in Gulf, TIMES-PICAYUNE (July 1, 2013), http://www.nola.
com/environmentlindex.ssfl2013/07/taylor energy-oilplatformdes_1.html.
21. Phil O'Keefe, Ken Westgate & Ben Wisner, Taking the Naturalness out of Natural
Disasters, 260 NATURE 566, 566 (1976).
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To accomplish those tasks, this article proceeds in three parts.
Part I first explains reasons that oil and gas infrastructure often
occupy land close to water, land often in danger of flooding, and
then describes three recent floods and the effects of those floods
on the oil and gas industry. As will be revealed, flooding damages
infrastructure, disrupts the energy economy, and leads to the re-
lease of oil and other chemicals into the environment.
Part II provides examples of how state and federal law ap-
proach the risks floods pose to oil and gas infrastructure. At the
federal level, it discusses the regulation of oil and gas pipelines
and federal law governing liability for oil spills. It also examines
the standards that the Bureau of Land Management has imposed
for gas development within one unit of federal land. At the state
level, this part examines Colorado and Pennsylvania law. It re-
veals that Colorado law places no constraint on oil and gas devel-
opment within floodplains. Pennsylvania law, on the other hand,
places some limitations on such development.
Part III explains various obstacles to sensible disaster policy
that I have developed elsewhere. Three categories of obstacles-
symbolic, cognitive, and structural-obstruct disaster policy. This
part then considers how these obstacles may play out in the con-
text of regulation of the oil and gas industry.
I. OIL AND GAS INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN THE FLOOD ZONE
The oil and gas industry often builds on land at risk of flooding.
This occurs throughout the production cycle. Oil and gas wells lie
next to rivers, oil pipelines run under their banks, and refineries
and storage facilities abut rivers, bays, swamps, and the open
ocean.
The proximity of this infrastructure to water occurs for at least
two reasons. In some circumstances, floodplains are simply avail-
able. This may be particularly true for operations extracting oil
and gas. Building codes and insurance requirements may, at least
to some degree, discourage construction in high-flood hazard are-
as, although such development often occurs at more than socially
optimal levels." But low-lying land at risk of flooding may also be
cheaper to purchase or lease. As one Colorado energy lawyer ex-
22. See Justin Pidot, Deconstructing Disaster, 2013 BYU L. REV. 213, 216-17 (2013).
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plained, oil and gas well pads are often placed within floodplains
to leave valuable agricultural land unoccupied.23 Floodplains that
overlie oil and gas resources may, therefore, prove appealing loca-
tions to energy companies seeking access to those resources.
Moreover, some legal frameworks may actively encourage en-
ergy development in floodplains. A Colorado statute provides that
"[o]pen space activities such as agriculture, horticulture, floricul-
ture, recreation, and mineral extraction shall be encouraged in
the floodplains,"" and Colorado law generally treats oil and gas
as a species of mineral.25 Moreover, the Colorado Oil and Gas
Conservation Commission ("COGCC"), which regulates oil and
gas development within the state, does not require energy com-
panies to maintain a minimum distance between wells and their
supporting infrastructure and waterways."
The relatively low value of land within floodplains is not the
only reason energy companies may choose to build in those areas.
Oil and gas infrastructure often relies on water. At the extraction
stage, this reliance arises because drilling for oil and natural gas
requires significant amounts of water.2 7 This is particularly true
where hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, is used to increase well
production, a practice that accounts for about 30% of oil produced
in the United States." Depending on geology, fracking a single
well can require between 50,000 and two million gallons of frack-
ing fluid, which, by volume, is predominantly water.29 Obtaining
23. Austin Rueschhoff, Oil and Gas Operations and Colorado's Floods: The Colorado
Oil and Gas Conservation Commission Tackles the Issues, U. DENV. WATER L. REV. (Nov.
14, 2013), http://duwaterlawreview.com/oil-and-gas-operations-and-colorados-floods-the-col
orado-oil-and-gas-conservation-commission-tackles-the-issues/.
24. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-65.1-202(2)(a)(I)(A) (2013).
25. See McCormick v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 983 P.2d 84, 86-88 (Colo. App. 1998) (col-
lecting cases, statutes, and treatises indicating that the term mineral includes oil and
gas).
26. See COLO. CODE REGS. § 404-1:603(a) (2014).
27. ERIK MIELKE ET AL., ENERGY TECH. INNOVATION POLIcY RESEARCH GRP., WATER
CONSUMrION OF ENERGY RESOURCE EXTRACTION, PROCESSING AND CONVERSION 5-7
(2010), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edulfiles/ETIP-DP-2010-15-final-4.pdf.
28. Asjylyn Loder, U.S. Shale-Oil Boom May Not Last as Fracking Wells Lack Staying
Power, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles
/2013-10-10/u-dot-a-dot-shale-oil-boom-may-not-last-as-fracking-wells-lack-staying-power.
29. COLO. OEL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM'N, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING, available at https://cogcc.state.co.us/Announcements/Hot_Topic
s/HydraulicFracturing/FrequentQuestionsaboutHydraulic%20Fracturing.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 18, 2014).
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this water can be controversial and difficult." This high demand
for water has driven debate in western states about water rights
as they apply to oil and gas development.3' Locating wells closer
to sources of water, like streams and rivers, decreases production
costs.
Refining and transportation facilities also need proximity to
water. As Tom KIoza, an oil analyst explains, "[T]he very nature
of the [oil & gas] storage business is that it has to be very close to
shipping lanes and ship channels and that puts it close to sea lev-
el."3 Pipelines that carry oil and gas throughout the country also
cross rivers and streams by necessity. For example, fifty-five oil
and gas pipelines cross the Missouri River."
Similarly, oil refineries are located near the Gulf Coast because
off-shore oil drilling produces significant quantities of oil and
transporting that oil inland would increase production costs." As
Denny Ellerman, a senior lecturer at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology Sloan School of Management, put it: "Offshore fa-
cilities and refining facilities are located where they are because
the oil is there, and there is good economic sense for locating a
significant refining capacity in the Gulf Coast.""
Locating oil and gas wells, pipelines, storage facilities, and re-
fineries near water, and often within floodplains, is not without
its risks. The sections that follow provide two illustrations of re-
cent floods and one illustration of a recent hurricane and the im-
pact that they had on production, transportation, and refinement
of oil and natural gas.
30. See Kate Galbraith, As Fracking Increases, So Do Fears About Water Supply, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2013, at A21.
31. See, e.g., Carolyn F. Burr et al., Water: The Fuel for Colorado Energy, 15 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 275, 291-94 (2012); see also David Kashi, Fracking Advance That Cuts Wa-
ter Use May Appease Some Opposition to Controversial Practice, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Sept.
30, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/fracking-advance-cuts-water-use-may-appease-some-op
position-controversial-practice-1412724.
32. Jeff Brady, Fuel Supply System Fixes Pick Up Gas After Superstorm Sandy, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 29, 2013), http://www.npr.org/20l3/10/29/241415235/fuel-supply-system-
fixes-pick-up-gas-after-superstorm-sandy.
33. Jack Nicas, Floods Put Pipelines at Risk: Records Suggest Erosion of Riverbeds
Jeopardizes Oil and Gas Infrastructure, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2012, at A3.
34. See Energy: A System at Risk, MASS. INST. OF TECH. SLOAN SCH. OF MGMT., http://
mitsloan.mit.edulnewsroom/indepth-disasters-energy.php (last visited Feb. 18, 2014); see
also Offshore Petroleum History, AM. OIL & GAS HISTORICAL Soc'Y, http://aoghs.orgloff
shore-exploration/offshore-oil-history/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
35. Energy: A System at Risk, supra note 34.
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A. Colorado Floods and Oil and Gas Drilling
Colorado has long been a major producer of oil and natural gas
and that production has significantly ramped up in recent years.
Oil production doubled between 2005 and 2013 and natural gas
development increased by 30% during that period." More than
4000 new wells were drilled in both 2007 and 2008, and more
than 2000 new wells were drilled in 2009, 2010, and 2011.37 The
state is now home to more than 50,000 active oil and natural gas
wells."
In September 2013, parts of Colorado were struck by severe
flooding, with some regions of the state experiencing what the
National Weather Service determined to be a one-in-a-thousand
year flood." Flood waters overtopped many of the rivers and
streams along the Front Range-the front face of the Rocky
Mountains that faces the great plains. 40 These flood waters exact-
ed a tremendous toll on Colorado communities, causing an esti-
mated $2 billion in property damage.4 ' The floods also caused sig-
nificant damage to oil and gas production wells, resulting in
releases of oil and other chemicals into the environment and the
disruption of energy supplies. In Weld County, the county with
the highest density of operating oil and gas wells in the nation,
36. Amy Harder, Fracking Foes Fight One Battle at a Time in Colorado, NAT'L J. (Nov.
17, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/new-energy-paradigm/fracking-foes-fight-one-
battle-at-a-time-in-colorado-20131117.
37. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM'N ET AL., WATER SOURCES AND DEMAND
FOR THE HYDRAULIC FRACTURING OF OIL AND GAS WELLS IN COLORADO FROM 2010
THROUGH 2015, at 2, available at http://cogec.state.co.us/Library/OilandGasWater_
SourcesFact_Sheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
38. COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM'N, COLORADO WEEKLY & MONTHLY OIL &
GAS STATISTICS 11 (2014), available at http://cogcc.state.co.us/Library/Statistics/CoWkly
MnthlyOGStats.pdf.
39. Colorado Under Water, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Sept. 20, 2013, at E6. The popular
designation of a flood as hundred-year, five-hundred-year, or one-thousand-year has noth-
ing to do with its frequency but rather, its probability. For an explanation of the math be-
hind the terminology, see U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 100-YEAR FLOOD: IT'S ALL ABOUT
CHANGE (2010).
40. See Michon Scott, Historic Rainfall and Floods in Colorado, CLIMATE.GOV (Sept.
17, 2013), http://www.climate.gov/news-features/event-tracker/historic-rainfall-and-floods-
colorado; see also Death Toll from Colorado Floods Rises to Seven, THE MALAY MAIL (Sept.
17, 2013), http://www.themalaymailonline.com/world/article/death-toll-from-colorado-flood
s-rises-to-seven.
41. See Andrea Rael, Colorado Flood Damage: Property Loss Estimated Around $2
Billion, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/23/col
orado-flood-damagen_3976222.html.
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more than 22,000 gallons of oil spilled into the South Platte River
when debris propelled by flood waters damaged storage tanks.4 2
All told, more than 1900 wells were shut down because of flood-
ing, 4 and state officials estimated releases into the environment
of approximately 62,000 gallons of oil and "production water"-
water used in the process of fracking and containing an array of
chemicals.4
B. Superstorm Sandy and Transportation Infrastructure
Hurricane Sandy swept through the northeastern United
States on October 29, 2012, causing a record setting storm surge
of up to thirteen feet." Hurricane damage dominated the news
cycle, particularly extensive damage that occurred in New York
City.46 Millions of residents lost power, some for extended periods
of time.47
Along with the human tragedy engendered by the storm, Hur-
ricane Sandy significantly disrupted distribution systems for fuel.
The oil terminal in New York Harbor was "crippled from Hurri-
cane Sandy," and normal operations in New York Harbor did not
42. Bruce Finley, Colorado Confirms More Oil Spills but Flood Flows Complicate
Clean-up, DENV. POST (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/environment/ci_2414
1077/colorado-confirms-more-oil-spills-flooded-weld-county; Laura Pritchett, Fracking Flu-
ids in the Flood, ONEARTH (Sept. 20, 2013), http://www.onearth.orglarticles/2013/09/a-vi
ew-from-above-shows-how-the-colorado-superstorm-damaged-fracking-facilities.
43. Mark Jaffe, Colorado Floods: 1,900 Oil and Gas Wells Shut as Crews Check Dam-
age, DENV. POST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/breaking%20news/ci_24116
404/oil-field-flood-tally-1-900-wells-shut.
44. Mark Jaffe, Lessons from Colorado's Flooded Oil and Gas Fields, DENV. POST:
BALANCE SHEET BLOG (Oct. 7, 2013), http://blogs.denverpost.com/thebalancesheet/2013/10/
07/oil-and-gas/11018/.
45. E.g., Pidot, supra note 22, at 214; Hurricane Sandy Fast Facts, CNN.coM (July 13,
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/world/americas/hurricane-sandy-fast-facts/.
46. See, e.g., Cara Buckley & William K. Rashbaum, Power Failures and Furious
Flooding Overwhelm Lower Manhattan and Red Hook, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/30/nyregion/red-hook-residents-defy-evacuation-warnings-drin
ks-in-hand.html?_r=0.
47. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY, DELIVERY & ENERGY RELIABILITY,
HURRICANE SANDY SITUATION REPORT # 11, at 1, 4 (2012) [hereinafter DOE SITUATION
REPORT], available at http://www.oe.netl.doe.gov/docs/2012_SitRep11.Sandy_11022012-
300PM.pdf; Terry Shawn, Fueling East Coast Relief, LOGLINES, Jan.-Feb. 2013, at 8-9
(2013).
48. Factbox- NY Harbor Oil Terminals, Refineries Crippled by Sandy, REUTERS (Nov.
11, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/11/us-storm-sandy-energy-idUSBRE8AA
OIP20121111 [hereinafter NY Harbor].
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resume for a week.4 1 In total, thirty-nine petroleum terminals
were affected by the storm."o The Colonial Pipeline, which sup-
plies 15% of the East Coast's fuel, was closed for more than a
week." These disruptions occurred both because of direct damage
from the storm and because many oil terminals were without
electricity and could not operate." This disruption caused signifi-
cant fuel shortages; ten days after the hurricane, more than a
quarter of the gas stations in the New York metropolitan area
had no gasoline to sell, and New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg ordered gasoline rationing."
Refineries in New York and New Jersey were also affected. A
Phillips 66 refinery ordinarily producing 238,000 barrels of fuel a
day was closed for more than a month for repairs.54 All told, Hur-
ricane Sandy affected approximately 7% of the refining capacity
in the United States.
Damage from the storm also caused serious oil spills. Tidal
surge damaged fuel tanks at an oil terminal operated by Motiva,
a subsidiary of Shell Oil, causing the release of 378,000 gallons of
diesel fuel, much of which entered local waters. Storm surge also
caused two other, smaller spills-one at an oil refinery, the sec-
ond at another oil terminal-of about 10,000 gallons each." As
49. TIFFANY C. SMYTHE, U.S. COAST GUARD ACAD., ASSESSING THE IMPACTS OF
HURRICANE SANDY ON THE PORT OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY'S MARITIME RESPONDERS
AND RESPONSE INFRASTRUCTURE 7 (2013), available at http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/re
searchlqr/submitted/smythe_2013.pdf.
50. DOE SITUATION REPORT, supra note 47, at 3.
51. NY Harbor, supra note 48.
52. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., NEW YORK/NEW JERSEY INTRA HARBOR
PETROLEUM SUPPLIES FOLLOWING HURRICANE SANDY: SUMMARY OF IMPACTS THROUGH
NOVEMBER 13, 2012, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/special/disruptions/hurric
ane/sandy/petroleum terminal_survey.pdf.
53. NY Harbor, supra note 48.
54. Id.; see also DOE SITUATION REPORT, supra note 47, at 2.
55. See NAT'L AsS'N FOR CONVENIENCE & FUEL RETAILING, How Hurricane Sandy Af-
fected the Fuels Industry, in 2013 RETAIL FUELS REPORT 63, 64 (2013), available at
http://www.nacsonline.com/YourBusiness/FuelsReports/GasPrices_2013/Pages/How-Hur
ricane-Sandy-Affected-the-Fuels-Industry.aspx.
56. See Ryan Hutchins, Rising Tide of Concern over Fuel Spills, STAR-LEDGER (New-
ark, N.J.), Nov. 14, 2012, at A3; News Release, N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Major Progress
Made in Containing and Cleaning up Arthur Kill Fuel Spill Caused by Sandy (Nov. 12,
2012), available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/newsrel/2012/12_0144.htm.
57. Ryan Hutchins, Oil Spills, Other Hurricane Sandy Damage Present N.J. with Po-
tential Pollution Headaches, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.) (Nov. 14, 2012), www.nj.com/ne
ws/index.ssfl2012/lhurricanesandyoilspills.html; see also Press Release, Nat'l Ocean-
ic & Atmospheric Admin., Office of Response & Restoration, Post Hurricane Sandy, NOAA
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the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA")
reported, in Hurricane Sandy's wake "[p]etroleum products, bio-
diesel, and other chemicals were leaking into the waters from pol-
lution sources such as damaged coastal industries, ruptured pe-
troleum storage tanks, and sunken and stranded vessels.""
The federal government, in cooperation with the New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection, developed a natural re-
source damage assessment and a plan for restoring the environ-
ment." Six months after Hurricane Sandy, Motiva entered into a
settlement with the agencies, agreeing to undertake restoration
work.60
C. Yellowstone River Flooding and the Silvertip Pipeline
Spills from oil pipelines are a substantial source of environ-
mental releases and such spills can occur when rivers flood and
riverbeds erode. A report issued by the Department of Transpor-
tation found that over the course of two decades, flooding and
erosion led to the release of 2.4 million gallons of crude oil and
other hazardous liquids into waters within the United States.
One recent incident of this type occurred along the Yellowstone
River in Montana. During the summer of 2011, snowmelt from
the Rocky Mountains caused flooding throughout much of the
Missouri River watershed, including a flood along stretches of the
Yellowstone River of a severity that the National Weather Service
estimated likely to repeat once every twenty-five to fifty years.62
Aids Hazardous Spill Cleanup in New Jersey and New York (Nov. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.nj.com/newsindex.ssfl2012/11/hurricane-sandy-oil-spills.html.
58. Press Release, Nat'l Oceanic & Atmospheric Admin., Office of Response & Resto-




61. Matthew Brown, Floods Blamed for 16 Pipeline Spills, DENv. POST (Jan. 3, 2013),
http://www.denverpost.com/environment/ci22304446/apnewsbreak-floods-blamed- 16-pipe
line-spills.
62. YELLOWSTONE RIVER CONSERVATION DIST. COUNCIL, YELLOWSTONE RIVER
PIPELINE RISK ASSESSMENT AND FLOODPLAIN RECLAMATION PLANNING PROJECT: FINAL
REPORT 1 (2012) (hereinafter YRCDC FINAL REPORT], available at nris.mt.gov/Yellowstone
/YellowstonePipeline_- Report_- 2012.pdf, Sandra Zellmer, Wilderness, Water, and Climate
Change, 42 ENVTL. L. 313, 327 (2012).
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The Yellowstone River is the longest dam-free river in the
United States, meandering between Wyoming and Montana,
through Yellowstone National Park, and eventually joining the
Missouri River near Burford, North Dakota." The Yellowstone,
renowned for its scenic beauty and high quality aquatic habitat,
is home to one of the few remaining populations of the sensitive
Yellowstone cutthroat trout, and the endangered pallid stur-
geon.
More than 13,000 miles of pipeline transporting crude oil and
natural gas traverse Montana." One of these pipelines, the Sil-
vertip Pipeline, is operated by ExxonMobil and traces parts of the
Yellowstone River's course, carrying crude oil almost seventy
miles from Elk Basin, Wyoming to an oil refinery in Billings,
Montana.6 6
During the 2011 summer floods, the Silvertip Pipeline rup-
tured near Laurel, Montana. The velocity and volume of water in
the Yellowstone did not directly damage the pipeline." Rather, of-
ficials believe the floodwaters eroded the riverbed beneath which
the pipeline was buried, and once exposed, debris carried along by
the river's current damaged the pipe." ExxonMobil shut off the
pipeline and stopped the flow of crude oil within about an hour,
but during that time, 1500 barrels-or approximately 47,000 gal-
63. See Yellowstone River: Detailed Waterbody Report, MONTANA FISH, WILDLIFE &
PARKS, http://fwp.mt.gov/fishing/guide/waterbodyDetail.html?llid=1039825479787 (last
visited Feb. 18, 2014).
64. See, e.g., Hearing on Silvertip Pipeline Oil Spill in Yellowstone Cnty., Montana,
Before the Subcomm. on R.R.s, Pipelines & Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on
Transp. & Infrastructure, 112th Cong. 29 (2011) [hereinafter House Hearing] (testimony of
Douglas B. Inkley); YRCDC FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 1; Robert E. Gresswell, Biol-
ogy, Status and Management of the Yellowstone Cutthroat Trout, 31 N. AM. J. FISHERIES
MGMT. 782, 782 (2011); Yellowstone River: Detailed Waterbody Report, supra note 63.
65. House Hearing, supra note 64, at 15 (testimony of Sen. Jon Tester). All told, the
United States has more than 2.5 million miles of pipeline. See id. at 17 (testimony of Cyn-
thia L. Quarterman, Administrator, PHMSA).
66. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Transp. Pipeline & Hazardous Materials Safety Ad-
min., U.S. Department of Transportation Proposes $1.7 Million in Civil Penalties for Exx-
onMobil for Yellowstone River Pipeline Failure (Mar. 25, 2013) [hereinafter PHMSA Pen-
alty Proposal], available at http://www.phmsa.dot.gov/portal/site/PHMSAlmenuitem.ebdc7
a8a7e39f2e55cf2031050248a0c/?vgnextoid=df3b5c7ea789d310VgnVCM100000d2c97898RC
RD&.
67. See Matthew Brown & Garance Burke, Yellowstone Oil Spill: Exxon Mobil Took
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lons-of crude oil spilled into the Yellowstone River.69 In the af-
termath of the flood, crude oil was found as far as 240 miles
downstream of the rupture.o
The spill disrupted the lives of those living along the banks of
the Yellowstone River. One resident explained that due to oil
fumes emanating from the river, "the only way I can breathe is to
have all the windows open."" The spill also disrupted public and
private water supplies drawn from the Yellowstone River, includ-
ing that of Billings, Montana.72 And crude oil released from the
pipeline "fouled nearby agricultural fields, pasture and lawns
along the banks.""
The rupture of the Silvertip Pipeline did not come without
warning.74 A nearby natural gas pipeline had similarly been dam-
aged due to erosion from floods in 2009 and local government offi-
cials had raised concerns with representatives from the oil indus-
try about further spills.75 In 2010 and 2011, local government
officials and federal regulators each contacted ExxonMobil to ex-
press specific concerns about the Silvertip Pipeline.7 ' And just
69. See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., PIPELINE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN.,
NOTICE OF PROBABLE VIOLATION, PROPOSED CIVIL PENALTY, AND PROPOSED COMPLIANCE
ORDER 1-2 (2013) [hereinafter PHMSA NOTICE], available at http://phmhqnwas062.phm
sa.dot.gov/staticfiles/PHMSA/DownloadableFiles/Files/Enforcement%20Decisions%20Files
/PCO 03252013.pdf; Memorandum of Agreement Between the Natural Res. Trustees &
ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. Governing Cooperative Tasks Related to the July 1, 2011 Oil
Spill on the Yellowstone River, Mont. (Oct. 3, 2011), available at http://www.blm.gov/pg
dataletc/medialibblm/mtiblminformationlyellowstoneoilspill.Par.80864.File.dat/8%20FIN
NAL%20Executed%20MOA%20ExxonMobil8-9-2012.pdf, see also Michael Berger, Drill,
Spill, and Bill: ExxonMobil, A Well Oiled Machine, 12 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 327, 330 (2012)
(reviewing STEVE COLL, PRIVATE EMPIRE: EXXONMOBIL AND AMERICAN POWER (2012));
Cally Carswell, Yellowstone Leak Highlights a Different Kind of Oil Spill, HIGH COUNTRY
NEWS (Aug. 8, 2011), www.hen.org/issues/43.13/yellowstone-leak-highlights-a-different-
kind-of-oil-spill. The federal safety board charged with investigating the leak found that
ExxonMobil's employees failed to notice the initial alarm that should have alerted them to
the leak. PHMSA NOTICE, supra, at 2. The concomitant delay accounted for approximately
1000 barrels of the spill. See id.; see also House Hearing, supra note 64, at 21.
70. See House Hearing, supra note 64, at viii.
71. Brown & Burke, supra note 67 (internal quotation marks omitted).
72. See House Hearing, supra note 64, at viii. The EPA estimated that there were
"hundreds of wells in the area." Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Update on Yel-
lowstone River Oil Spill (Silvertip Pipeline) (July 10, 2011), available at http://yosemite.
epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsfl20edldfal751192c8525735900400c30/cl4fbb2fel29eel6852578
ca004b425b!OpenDocument.
73. PHMSA NOTICE, supra note 69, at 2.
74. Id. at 2-3.
75. Id. at 3.
76. House Hearing, supra note 64, at 4; PHMSA NOTICE, supra note 69, at 3. The ad-
ministrator of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration described the
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weeks before the rupture, officials again alerted ExxonMobil of
their concerns.7 In response, on several occasions ExxonMobil
"shut down the line for several hours to assess the situation but
decided each time to resume operations."7 As a result of these re-
peated warnings, the Federal Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration ("PHMSA") alleged that "[t]he risk of flood-
ing on the Yellowstone River was a known threat that could cause
the pipe in the river to lose physical support and potentially rup-
ture.""
In the wake of the spill, federal and state agencies cooperative-
ly developed a corrective action plan and assessed natural re-
sources damages pursuant to OPA and state law." ExxonMobil
spent an estimated $135 million carrying out the cleanup.8 ' The
federal government also proposed a $1.7 million civil penalty.
ExxonMobil has challenged the penalty, contending that the
company took "reasonable precautions" to prevent the spill.
II. OIL AND GAS REGULATION AND FLOOD RISK
This section describes a few of the legal regimes that address
oil and gas development and explains how they affect activities
concerns thus: "I think the original concern was associated with the south river bank of
the crossing, where there was a concern that there was erosion there. . . . We were con-
cerned, not just with this particular pipeline, but with all the pipelines that were in flood-
ed areas throughout the United States." House Hearing, supra note 64, at 20 (testimony of
Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, PHMSA).
77. See PHMSA NOTICE, supra note 69, at 3 (alleging officials from the city of Laurel
approached the pipeline operators on June 24).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 5.
80. See U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., NOTICE OF INTENT TO CONDUCT RESTORATION
PLANNING: JULY 1, 2011 YELLOWSTONE RIVER OIL SPILL 1 (2013), available at http://www.
blm.gov/pgdataletc/medialib/blm/mt/blminformation/yellowstoneoilspill.Par.5450.File.dat/
10%20Notice%20of%/o2OIntent%20to%2Conduct%20Restoration%20Planning.pdf- see also
Violations of the Montana Water Quality Act by ExxonMobil Pipeline Company, at Sil-
vertip Pipeline, No. WQA-12-08 (Mont. Dep't of Envtl. Quality Jan. 19, 2012) (order on
consent), available at http://www.contractormisconduct.org/ass/contractors/23/cases/1740/
2599/exxon-mobil-yellowstone-spill-state-settlement order.pdf. Other documents related
to the natural resources damages assessment are available at http://www.blm.gov/mt/
st/en/info/yellowstonespill.html.
81. Exxon Challenging $1.7M Penalty for Yellowstone River Pipeline Break,
MISSOULIAN (July 17, 2013), http://missoulian.com/news/state-and-regional/exxonchalleng
ing-m-penalty-for-yellowstone-river-pipeline-break/articleab2elcb0-eflc-11e2-a603-001a
4bcf887a.html [hereinafter Exxon Challenge].
82. See PHMSA Penalty Proposal, supra note 66.
83. Exxon Challenge, supra note 81.
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within floodplains. It is by no means comprehensive. Rather,
these examples provide a sense of the approaches various state
governments and the federal government have taken to address
the issue. This section primarily focuses on regulations that di-
rectly address flood risks-such as restrictions on development
activities within floodplains-although it also identifies some
regulatory efforts that have incidental benefits for reducing vul-
nerability of oil and gas infrastructure to flood risks-such as
rules requiring that oil and gas infrastructure be set back from
water bodies." As will be revealed, flood risk has not figured cen-
trally into the regulation of oil and gas to date. Indeed, some
states (like Colorado) impose no regulations on development with-
in floodplains.
This section does not consider the considerable range of regula-
tory actions taken at the local level. Much land-use planning oc-
curs through local zoning ordinances and other local laws. In re-
cent years, a few local governments have aggressively regulated
aspects of oil and gas development. For example, several Colorado
towns have banned fracking within their borders." Other local
governments are slowly coming to the conclusion that they need
new strategies to reduce vulnerability to natural hazards. In the
wake of Hurricane Katrina, for example, Louisiana's Calcasieu
Parish developed a multi-jurisdictional hazard mitigation plan in
an effort to coordinate the regulatory activities of six communities
within the parish." The plan articulates its goal as "develop [ing]
mitigation strategies that reduce the loss of life and property,
human suffering, economic disruption, and disaster assistance
costs resulting from natural disasters."" Yet, notwithstanding en-
couragement from the federal government, local governments
84. Examples of rules with incidental benefits are rules requiring that infrastructure
be set back from bodies of water. Such setback requirements do not directly address flood
risks because the buffer requirement is measured from the banks of a stream or river, ra-
ther than from the floodplain. Moreover, the central focus of such rules tends to be concern
that technological failures or accidents will release chemicals into the environment and
that a setback will reduce the amount of those chemicals that will enter the waterbody.
85. Kristen Wyatt, Three Front Range Cities Ban Hydraulic Fracturing, DENV. POST
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.denverpost.cominews/ci_24465840/3-front-range-cities-ban-hydr
aulic-fracturing.
86. CALCASIEU PARISH, OFFICE OF HOMELAND SEC. & EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS,
MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN 1 (2006), available at http://www.louisi
anaspeaks-parishplans.org/projectattachments/000740/CalcaDMA_0216-2006.pdf.
87. Id. at 2. The specific strategies for mitigating flooding included in the plan largely
involve information generation, rather than adoption of new regulations. Id. at 123-24.
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generally have done a poor job of deploying land-use laws to miti-
gate natural hazards."
A. Federal Law
1. Oil Pollution Act of 1990
In the wake of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Congress passed OPA
to reduce the risk of spills from oil tankers and lessen barriers to
imposing liability on entities responsible for such spills." Much
has been written about the advantages and foibles of OPA,o and
Congress is considering modifications to the law to address issues
that arose from the Deepwater Horizon oil spill.'
As relevant here, OPA imposes strict liability on those respon-
sible for oil spills.92 The law does not directly regulate oil and gas
development in flood-prone locations. Rather, by imposing finan-
cial liability for spills, the law creates incentives for selecting lo-
cations, construction techniques, and operational procedures that
minimize the risk of spills due to floods-at least to the extent
that the risk-adjusted expected liability outweighs the cost of
such locations, techniques, and procedures." This liability will
88. See Pidot, supra note 22, at 216-18.
89. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006) (imposing strict liability on "each responsible
party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged'); 46 U.S.C. § 3703a (2006) (re-
quiring double hulls for most oil tankers); see also Gabarick v. Laurin Mar. (America) Inc.,
623 F. Supp. 2d 741, 744-45 (E.D. La. 2009) (outlining liability standards under OPA).
OPA was not the first federal law addressing liability for oil spills. For a discussion of the
history of such laws, see Kenneth M. Murchison, Liability Under the Oil Pollution Act:
Current Law and Needed Revisions, 71 LA. L. REV. 917, 918-25 (2011). Other federal stat-
utes, like the Clean Water Act, also prohibit discharge of oil into the environment. See 33
U.S.C. § 1321 (2006 & Supp. V 2012); 40 C.F.R. § 110.2 (2013); see also ENVTL. PROT.
AGENCY OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE, PROFILE OF THE OL AND GAS EXTRACTION INDUSTRY 81-
98 (2000).
90. See, e.g., Matthew P. Harrington, Necessary and Proper, But Still Unconstitution-
al: The Oil Pollution Act's Delegation of Admiralty Power to the States, 48 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1 (1997); Lawrence I. Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial Responsibility
Under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Review of the Second Decade, 36 TUL. MAR. L.J. 1
(2011); David H. Sump, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990: A Glance in the Rearview Mirror, 85
TUL. L. REV. 1101 (2011); Steven R. Swanson, OPA 90 + 10: The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
After 10 Years, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 135 (2001).
91. See, e.g., Kiern, supra note 90, at 11-14.
92. 33 U.S.C. § 2702 (2006); see also Gabarick, 623 F. Supp. 2d at 744-45.
93. See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J.
LEGAL STuD. 357, 357 (1984). As Shavell explains, a strict liability rule will better lead to
socially optimal levels of behavior. Id. at 359 (explaining that under a strict liability re-
gime parties "are motivated to balance the true costs of reducing risks against the ex-
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not, however, fully account for cleanup costs and natural resource
damages caused by oil spills resulting from flooding or other nat-
ural disasters for at least three reasons.
First, OPA includes an "act of God" defense that eliminates lia-
bility where spills are caused by "unanticipated grave natural
disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevita-
ble, and irresistible character the effects of which could not have
been prevented or avoided by the exercise of due care or fore-
sight."" The contours of this defense are unclear, and courts have
provided little guidance as to its application." The Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana has, for example, suggested that "Hurricane
Katrina may well be considered to have been an [a]ct of God,"96
but that court also explained that a party seeking to invoke the
act of God defense must demonstrate that it "took reasonable pre-
cautions under the circumstances as known or reasonably to be
anticipated."" The executive branch of the United States govern-
ment appears not to view Hurricane Katrina as necessarily trig-
gering the act of God defense because the government has identi-
fied responsible parties for spills during the hurricane and
initiated natural resource damage assessments.
pected savings in losses caused").
94. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701(1), 2703 (2006).
95. For a discussion of the act of God defense generally, see Jill M. Fraley, Re-
examining Acts of God, 27 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 669 (2010). The defense has rarely been
considered in the context of OPA. In Apex Oil Co. v. United States, a United States district
court affirmed an administrative determination that OPA's act of God defense did not ap-
ply where strong currents caused a barge to hit a bridge. 208 F. Supp. 2d 642, 646-47
(E.D. La. 2002). The administrative agency found that the currents-which resulted from
flooding in the river-were not unanticipated, that the accident was preventable, and that
the ship captain's decision to proceed with the voyage even knowing the conditions in the
river constituted an independent cause of the accident. Id. In United States v. J.R. Nelson
Vessel, Inc., a United States district court found the owner of a vessel partially sunk dur-
ing a "severe storm" liable under OPA. 1 F. Supp. 2d 172, 173-76 (E.D.N.Y. 1998). The
court did not, however, accept the act of God defense because "[t]he defendants ma[de] no
effort to establish that the storm was of such a magnitude" as required by OPA. Id. at 176
n.2. An unreported decision from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania suggests that an oil
spill caused by a thunderstorm could potentially fall under the act of God defense. See
Penn's Landing Marine Trade Ctr. Assocs. v. Coastal Eagle Point Oil Co., No. CIV.A.96-
CV-2098, 1996 WL 547208 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 25, 1996) ("Because the spill occurred during a
thunderstorm, litigation of the availability of an act of God defense could be a key factor in
determining the outcome . . . .").
96. In re S. Scrap Material Co., 713 F. Supp. 2d 568, 578 (E.D. La. 2010).
97. Id. (quoting In re United States v. Steamship Joseph Lykes, 425 F.2d 991, 995
(5th Cir. 1970)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
98. See Mark Schleifstein, Extent of Oil Spills from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Is
Still Being Assessed, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.nola.com/katrinalin
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Second, OPA caps total liability at $350 million for any "on-
shore facility" or "deepwater port."" The cap may be sufficiently
high to cover many oil spills caused by flooding. But probably not
all. For example, ExxonMobil spent $135 million in response to
the 45,000 gallons of oil spilled as a result of the Silvertip Pipe-
line rupture.100 This suggests that the costs of responding to the
most severe spills, and repairing the resulting environmental
damage, could easily exceed the caps. The potential gap between
the total harm-environmental and economic-caused by a spill
and the liability cap has stirred some controversy in recent years,
and in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, President
Obama has suggested raising-but not eliminating-the liability
caps.10' These caps limit the expected liability faced by an oil and
gas company, and thereby provide it with an inadequate incentive
to use measures to avoid or mitigate flood risks that would oth-
erwise be cost-justified. As Kenneth Murchison suggests, OPA's
liability caps also raise equity concerns. "By immunizing compa-
nies engaged in producing and transporting oil against full liabil-
ity for the losses associated with their activities," he writes,
"[OPA] unfairly shifts the loss from the party benefitting from
highly profitable economic activities to innocent individuals and
property owners."'02
Third, even the most technologically advanced response to an
oil spill will leave significant amounts of oil in the environment,
and even once that oil dissipates, the environmental consequenc-
es will persist for years.' That is why two decades after the Exx-
on Valdez spill, the environment had still not fully recovered.'o
dex.ssfl2010/08/extent-ofLoil-spills from_2005_hurricanes isstill_beingassessed.html.
99. 33 U.S.C. § 2704; see Murchison, supra note 89, at 931; see also Kiern, supra note
90, at 14.
100. See The American Energy Initiative, Part 11: The Pipeline Infrastructure and
Community Protection Act of 2011: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Energy & Power of the
H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 112th Cong. 48 (2011) (statement of Rep. Henry A.
Waxman, Member, Subcomm. on Energy & Power); David Jay, ExxonMobil Expects MT
Oil Spill to Cost Company $135M, KPAX.coM (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.ktvq.com/news
/exxonmobil-expects-oilspill-to-cost-company-135-million/.
101. See Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Legisla-
tive Package (May 12, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/fact-
sheet-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-legislative-package.
102. Murchison, supra note 89, at 937.
103. See, e.g., JONATHAN L. RAMSEUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41531, DEEPWATER
HORIZON OIL SPILL: THE FATE OF THE OIL 8-11 (2010).
104. See William Yardley, Community's Recovery Still Incomplete After Exxon Valdez
Spill, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2010, at A27.
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Moreover, some spills almost certainly go undetected, allowing
responsible parties to avoid liability altogether. And finally, as
demonstrated by the federal government's failure to yet complete
its assessment for Hurricane Katrina-related spills, the OPA pro-
cess can be prolonged and in some cases inconclusive. For these
reasons, OPA liability creates only a muffled financial incentive
for the oil and gas industry to consider the full risks associated
with development decisions in flood-prone areas.
Because liability under OPA will, on average, fall below the
cost of fully remediating environmental damage caused by oil
spills, the industry will rationally decline to take some preventa-
tive measures where the benefits of those measures would exceed
their costs. Such decisions against prevention will lead to more
frequent and more severe oil spills, and the concomitant damage
to human health, the economy, and the environment. OPA, then,
is not a complete solution.
2. Federal Pipeline Safety Regulation
After pipeline accidents in 2010 and 2011, Congress passed the
Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of
2011, to reauthorize PHMSA, the federal regulatory agency that
oversees oil and gas pipelines, and to provide that agency with
enhanced authority.1o' Paradoxically, the law also requires
PHMSA to delay issuing any new regulation of pipelines for at
least two years, undercutting the agency's ability to respond to
recent spills.'o
PHMSA promulgates regulations that set standards for oil and
gas pipelines. These standards do not primarily impose require-
ments related to natural hazards. The regulations do require a
pipeline operator to take unspecified action if the "operator de-
termines that outside force [including floods] is a threat to the in-
tegrity of" the pipeline,"' and also impose specific requirements
when pipes cross rivers-which affects the likelihood of damage
105. See Pipeline Safety, Regulatory Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L.
No. 112-90, 125 Stat. 1904, 1904 (2012); Susan A. Olenchuk et al., Potential Impact of New
Pipeline Safety Laws on PHMSA's Regulatory Initiatives, PIPELINE & GAS J. (Apr. 2012),
http://www.pipelineandgasjournal.com/potential-impact-new-pipeline-safety-laws-phmsa
%E2%80%99s-regulatory-initiatives.
106. See Olenchuk, supra note 105.
107. 49 C.F.R. § 192.935(b)(2) (2012).
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to pipes during flood events. The current regulatory requirement
is that "all pipe installed in a navigable river, stream, or harbor"
must be buried at least four feet below the river bottom, although
this requirement has come under fire as inadequate to protect
against rupture."' The regulations also require operators to moni-
tor pipelines for leakage and report any spills that occur.o' Final-
ly, they require operators to install automatic or remote control
valves to shut off pipelines if "an operator determines, based on a
risk analysis" that such valves "would be an efficient means of
adding protection to a high consequence area."no
As indicated by the regulations and illustrated by the discus-
sion of the Silvertip Pipeline spill above, PHMSA relies heavily on
operators to determine safe design practices and to monitor and
address problems. Even after the 2013 reauthorization, the head
of PHMSA's division charged with pipeline safety described the
pipeline regulation as "kind of dying" and explained that the
agency has "very few tools to work with.""
3. Federal Management in the Pinedale Anticline
The United States Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") man-
ages oil and gas leasing and development within 700 million acres
of federally owned mineral estate."2 This accounts for a tremen-
108. Id. § 192.327(e); Nicas, supra note 33, at A3. The regulations permit a pipe to lie
only two feet below the river bottom if it is covered in "consolidated rock." 49 C.F.R. §
197.327(e).
109. 49 C.F.R. § 191.23(a)(6) (requiring reporting of leaks); id. § 192.517(a)(7) (requir-
ing recordkeeping of leaks); id. § 192.706 (requiring transmission line surveys for leaks).
110. Id. § 192.935(c).
111. Marcus Stern & Sebastian Jones, Pipeline Safety Chief Says His Regulatory Pro-
cess Is 'Kind of Dying, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (Sept. 11, 2013), http://insideclimate
news.org/news/20130911/exclusive-pipeline-safety-chief-says-his-regulatory-process-kind-
dying.
112. The BLM administers the leasing of minerals found beneath the 258 million
surface acres managed by the Bureau, 57 million surface acres where the min-
erals are Federally owned but the surface is non-Federal (mostly private) own-
ership, as well as another 385 million acres whose surface is managed by other
Federal agencies.
Leasing of Onshore Federal Oil and Gas Resources, BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEPT.
OF THE INTERIOR (Oct. 20, 2009), www.blm.gov/wo/stlen/prog/energy/oil and-gastleasing
_ofonshore.html; see also 30 U.S.C. § 226(h) (2006) ("The Secretary of the Interior may
not issue any lease on National Forest System Lands reserved from the public domain
over the objection of the Secretary of Agriculture."); Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest
Serv., 165 F.3d 43, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1999) ('The [Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Re-
form] Act divides responsibility and authority for the issuing of [oil and gas] leases be-
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dous amount of oil and gas development. In 2012, BLM managed
almost 50,000 leases, upon which more than 3000 new oil or gas
wells were drilled."' BLM typically develops management plans
for each unit under its control and those plans include plans for
oil and gas development."' In fashioning these plans, the BLM is
directed to "use and observe the principles of multiple use and
sustained yield.""5
In 2008, BLM revised one such plan that governs its manage-
ment of the Pinedale Anticline, an area of almost 200,000 acres in
western Wyoming that "is now considered the third-largest natu-
ral gas field in the United States.""' The Green and New Fork
Rivers, three perennial streams, and numerous ephemeral
streams flow above the oil and gas resources contained within the
Pinedale Anticline.n' Prior to adoption of the 2008 revised plan,
there were over 600 federally regulated wells producing oil and
gas, some of which were drilled within one-hundred-year flood
plains."' The revised plan envisions drilling more than 4000 wells
within the area.'
Recognizing that the waterways that cross the Pinedale Anti-
Cline could flood, and that floods could impact natural gas wells
and supporting infrastructure, BLM acknowledged as a foreseea-
ble environmental consequences of its plan that "physical damage
during flood events" constituted one of the "principal risks of
pipeline operations that could lead to leaks/releases."'2 0 To reduce
tween the Secretary of Interior, acting through the Bureau of Land Management ... and
the Secretary of Agriculture, acting through the Forest Service.").
113. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., SUMMARY OF ONSHORE OIL & GAS STATISTICS (2012),
available at http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/energy/oil-and-gas/statistics.html.
114. See 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2006).
115. Id. § 1712(c)(1); see Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P'ship v. Salazar, 661 F.3d
66, 69 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
116. Roosevelt P'ship, 661 F.3d at 69; see also BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., REVISED DRAFT
SUPPLEMENTAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PINEDALE ANTICLINE OIL
AND GAS EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT 1-5 (2007) [hereinafter BLM SEIS
DRAFT], available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdataletc/medialib/blm/wy/information/NEPA/
pfodocs/antidine/rd-seis.Par.87718.File.dat/00rd-seis.pdf.
117. BLM SEIS DRAFT, supra note 116, at 3-85 to 3-86.
118. Id. at 1-9, 3-109.
119. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., RECORD OF DECISION, FINAL SUPPLEMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR THE PINEDALE ANTICLINE OIL AND GAS
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECT SUBLETTE COUNTY, WYOMING 4 (2008) [herein-
after BLM SEIS FINAL ROD], available at http://www.blm.gov/pgdataletc/medialibfblm/
wy/information/NEPApfodocs/anticline/rod.Par.50775.File.dat/OOROD.pdf.
120. BLM SEIS DRAFT, supra note 116, at 4-108 to 4-109. The plan suggests that peri-
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this risk, as part of its management restrictions BLM provided
that "federally-managed 100-year floodplains will have no per-
manent structures constructed within their boundaries unless it
can be demonstrated on a case-by-case basis that there is no
physically practical alternative. In cases where floodplain con-
struction is approved, additional constraints could be applied." 2 '
It is unclear the extent to which BLM will grant such exceptions.
The rules BLM places on gas development within floodplains
are not a perfect solution. They allow physical infrastructure
within floodplains in some circumstances, and provide no protec-
tion against floods more severe than those expected to occur once
every hundred years. That latter limitation may be of particular
concern if climate change-induced perturbations in precipitation
patterns lead to more frequent and more severe flooding in the
Pinedale area. But BLM acknowledges concerns about flooding
and has undertaken a modest effort to address the risks that
flooding poses to oil and gas development.
B. State Law
1. Pennsylvania Law
Between 2008 and 2013, natural gas production in the Marcel-
lus Shale, which underlies parts of Pennsylvania and West Vir-
ginia, became the single largest source of dry shale natural gas in
the country.12 In response to this boom in natural gas develop-
ment, the Pennsylvania General Assembly adopted Act 13,122
which creates state-wide regulation of drilling activities that im-
poses regulatory standards on development and simultaneously
preempts zoning laws promulgated by local governments.124 In
December 2013, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that Act
13 unconstitutionally displaced local zoning efforts,125 but the
standard set under the law remains relevant, particularly be-
odic monitoring would "correct problems before failures occur." Id. at 4-109.
121. BLM SEIS FINAL ROD, supra note 119, at A-12.
122. See Press Release, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Natural Gas Weekly Update (Jan. 9,
2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/weekly/archive/2014/01_09/index.cfm.
123. Act 13, 2012 Pa. Laws 87 (codified at 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301-3504 (West
Cum. Supp. 2013)).
124. Id.; see Andrew Maykuth, What Pa. Court's Ruling on Gas-Drilling Law Means,
PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 22, 2013, at Al.
125. Maykuth, supra note 124, at Al.
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cause the oil and gas industry has agreed to voluntarily abide by
certain regulatory standards.'2 6
Act 13 was widely viewed as a win for the oil and gas industry,
which supported its passage. 2  The law standardized environ-
mental requirements for drilling activities, but in so doing dis-
placed any more protective local zoning rules.'28
Aspects of Act 13 directly address flood risks, specifically regu-
lating floodplains as delineated by the federal government as part
of the National Flood Insurance Program.' Under the Act's pro-
visions, wells may not be drilled within floodplains if the well site
will include impoundments or storage tanks for produced water
or other liquids associated with the drilling activity.' Act 13 al-
lows the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection
to waive this restriction if it approves a plan to address flood
risks that is supported by a commitment by the well operator to
comply with best practices identified by the department. '3 Act 13
directs state environmental regulators to consider a variety of
factors when reviewing and approving a well operator's water
management plan.'32
Other environmental standards included in Act 13 also offer
some mitigation of the risks that floods pose to well pads. This oc-
curs because the Act imposes buffer zones around certain envi-
ronmentally sensitive areas. Wells may not be drilled within 1000
feet of water supply wells, and ordinarily may not be drilled with-
in three hundred feet of streams and springs."' Such standards
do not address flood risk directly, because depending on local to-
126. Timothy Puko, Pennsylvania's Oil and Gas Drillers to Honor Act 13 Buffers, PITT.
TRIB.-REV. (Jan. 7, 2014), http://triblive.com/business/headlines/5370227-74/corbett-gas-
oil?printerfriendly=true#axzz2rcO5sY2s.
127. See Bill Reed, Major Parts of Pa.'s Natural-Gas Law Ruled Unconstitutional,
PHILA. INQUIRER, July 27, 2012, at Al. The President of the Marcellus Shale Coalition ex-
plained that organization's support for the law: "Lack of uniformity has long been an
Achilles' heel for Pennsylvania and must be resolved if the commonwealth is to remain a
leader in responsible American natural-gas development ..... Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
128. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2301-3504 (West Cum. Supp. 2013).
129. Id. § 3215(f). Where national flood maps do not exist, the Act defines the flood-
plain as up to 100 linear feet from the banks of a perennial stream and fifty linear feet
from the banks of an intermittent stream. Id. § 3215(0(5).
130. Id. § 3215(f)(1)(i)-(ii).
131. Id. § 3215(f)(3)-(4).
132. Id. § 3211(m)(2).
133. Id. § 3215(a)--(b)(1).
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pography, these buffers may not track floodplains. The buffers do
provide some benefit in this regard, however, because areas clos-
est to streams and rivers are more likely to be subject to an in-
creased risk of flooding.
Act 13 garnered the ire of the environmentalist community,
and concerns about flooding animate one aspect of this concern.
In an amicus brief filed before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
Trout Unlimited, Inc. argued that the preemption provisions of
Act 13 "eliminate a municipality's ability to protect natural re-
sources under [the Pennsylvania Constitution], by usurping a
municipality's local authority to regulate floodplain activities and
by attempting to occupy the entire field of environmental regula-
tion."13' Trout Unlimited, Inc., specifically identified more protec-
tive floodplain regulations adopted by Pine Township as casual-
ties of Act 13.'13 Supporters of Act 13 argued that it afforded more
protection state-wide than the preexisting legal regime. 136
As mentioned, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court invalidated
parts of Act 13 as contrary to the Pennsylvania Constitution. The
state has asked the court to reconsider its decision. 137
2. Colorado Law
The State of Colorado imposes few restrictions on oil and gas
development within floodplains. To the contrary, a statute ad-
dressing development within floodplains provides that "[o]pen
space activities such as agriculture, horticulture, floriculture, rec-
reation, and mineral extraction shall be encouraged in the flood-
plains,""' and as previously noted, Colorado law generally treats
oil and gas as a species of mineral."' In other words, Colorado law
134. Brief for Trout Unlimited, Inc. as Amicus Curiae at 7, Robinson Twp. v. Common-
wealth, 52 A.3d 463 (Pa. 2012) (No. 284 M.D. 2012), 2012 WL 8685071; see also Update:
Where PA Stands with Act 13, PA. CAMPAIGN FOR CLEAN WATER (Dec. 3, 2012), http:
//www.pacleanwatercampaign.org/gasdrilling/update-where-pa-stands-with-act-13/.
135. Brief for Trout Unlimited, Inc., supra note 134, at 3-4.
136. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 127; Dave Spigelmyer, Letter to the Editor, Limiting
Benefits, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 1, 2014, at A19; see also PA. CAMPAIGN FOR CLEAN WATER,
supra note 134.
137. See Don Hopey, Corbett Administration Asks Justices to Reconsider Act 13, PITT.
POST-GAZETTE, Jan. 2, 2014, at Bl.
138. Supra note 23 and accompanying text.
139. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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suggests that oil and gas development is a preferred use of flood-
plains.
In 2012, COGCC, which is the primary state agency charged
with regulating oil and gas development, adopted new "setback
rules" that prohibit the drilling of oil and gas wells within certain
distances from dwellings and certain other buildings.140 Notably,
the rules do not require operators to distance well pads and their
supporting infrastructure from rivers or streams. They do, how-
ever, require that "[a]ll equipment at drilling and production sites
in. . . floodplain areas shall be anchored to the extent necessary
to resist flotation, collapse, lateral movement, or subsidence."'4 '
In the wake of flooding in September 2013, COGCC has issued
"recommended practices" for reconstruction of oil and gas wells
and their supporting infrastructure within floodplains.' These
practices are voluntary, and do not discourage development with-
in floodplains. Rather, the guidelines identify construction tech-
niques and materials that COGCC identified as holding up well
during the flood event.
III. OBSTACLES TO DISASTER POLICY
The preceding sections provide examples of the threat that
floodwaters pose to the infrastructure necessary to extract,
transport, refine, and store oil and gas, and also of existing state
and federal policies that serve to mitigate, at least marginally,
that threat. If, as we have seen, oil spills caused by flooding are
among the most serious that occur, why do political leaders lavish
attention on these events in formulating public policy, while vir-
140. See Final Setback Rules, Cause No. IR, Docket No. 1211-RM-04, Colo. Oil & Gas
Conservation Comm'n (codified in scattered sections of COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 404-1:100,
-1:300, -1:600, -1:800), available at http://cogcc.state.co.us/RRHF2012/Setbacks/FinalRul
es/FinalSetbackRules.pdf.
141. Id. at § 603.g.
142. See generally COLO. OIL & GAS CONSERVATION COMM'N, RECOMMENDED
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tually ignoring spills that involve natural forces? 14' This section
attempts to provide some insight into that question.
A. Symbolic, Cognitive, and Structural Dimensions of Disaster
Policy
In a previous work, I developed a theoretical framework ex-
plaining existing deficits in public policy governing development
in areas subject to natural hazards.144 I identified three categories
of obstacles to sound disaster policy: symbolic obstacles, cognitive
obstacles, and structural obstacles.145 These obstacles interact and
reinforce each other, impairing the ability of government deci-
sion-makers to craft public policy to address the problems posed
by natural disasters.4  Here, I briefly recount this theoretical
framework before considering the particular dimensions of the oil
and gas industry.
Symbolic obstacles to disaster policy emerge out of the way that
natural disasters are conceived of in the national consciousness.
Natural disasters are commonly framed as "acts of God" or "acts
of nature," imbuing the forces themselves with perceived agen-
cy.'47 This framing occurs in part through media accounts of natu-
ral disasters, which often depict areas struck by natural disasters
as war zones and natural forces as an invading enemy. 4 1 Political
leaders and advocacy groups similarly deploy the language of
143. See, e.g., Kiern, supra note 90, at 8-10. Lawrence Kiern, a retired captain in the
United States Coast Guard, contrasted the spill from the Cosco Busan oil tanker in San
Francisco Bay and the Silvertip Pipeline rupture along the Yellowstone River explaining
that the former "captured extensive media attention, prompted congressional hearings,
and resulted in criminal convictions for both the vessel-operating company and the pilot,"
while the Silvertip Pipeline spill "attracted only modest media attention and appeared to
be handled as a routine response by both the responsible party and government officials."
Id. at 1, 8-9.
144. Pidot, supra note 22, at 213.
145. Id. at 218.
146. Id. at 218-19.
147. Id. at 227, 230.
148. See, e.g., Deadly Joplin Tornado Was One Year Ago, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL,
May 22, 2012, at C8 (describing the site of the tornado as "a bombed-out city in a war
zone"); Calvin Adkins, Town Un-Common, DAILY SOUTHERNER (Tarboro, N.C.) (Aug. 31,
2011), http://www.dailysoutherner.com/x803539061/TOWN-UN-COMMON (stating that
the site of the hurricane 'looked like a war zone"); Ron Scherer, After the Snowstorm: Pow-
er Outages Mean No Heat, No Trick-or-Treating, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Oct. 31, 2011),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/2011/1031/After-the-snowstorm-Power-outages-mean-no-
heat-no-trick-or-treating (stating that the site of the blizzard "resembles a war zone").
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armed conflict to discuss natural disasters.'49 While there are su-
perficial similarities between areas enmeshed in armed conflict
and those suffering the aftereffects of a natural disaster, the met-
aphor is rather inapt. As I have explained: "Nature does not at-
tack strategically or with malice like human foes, and responsibil-
ity for the damage caused by natural events lies in no small part
with individuals that build in areas subject to natural hazards
and the policymakers that facilitate this activity.""'
Reliance on the metaphor of armed conflict to describe and un-
derstand natural disasters has real world consequences. Within
that metaphor, anything short of reconstructing that which has
been lost or damaged amounts to surrender. In other words, to
secure victory when disaster strikes, society responds with a
"knee-jerk reaction . .. to rebuild the same roads and bridges that
existed before and bigger, more expensive homes."'' The symbol-
ism of armed conflict and social resistance to disaster incites peo-
ple to rebuild in the path of hurricanes, floods, and other disas-
ters rather than retreat1 52 -and encourages the government to
implicitly support such activity through policy"-even when such
activities are likely not the best course of action.
Cognitive obstacles likewise impede sound disaster policy. The
basic architecture of the human brain shapes perceptions of
risk.'5 4 Scientists have uncovered numerous mental shortcuts-
often referred to as heuristics-that influence thinking."' Several
149. See Pidot, supra note 22, at 232-33; see also John Schwartz & Campbell Robert-
son, Hurricane Gains Power and Hits Louisiana Coast, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2012, at Al
(quoting New Orleans Mayor Mitch Landrieu as Hurricane Isaac approached New Orleans
as saying "[wie are officially into the fight, and the city of New Orleans is now on the front
lines") (internal quotation marks omitted); Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2011, at
All (advertisement in support of federal disaster insurance program describing "Mother
Nature" as a terrorist).
150. Pidot, supra note 22, at 225; see also Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law After
Katrina: Reforming Environmental Law by Reforming Environmental Lawmaking, 81
TUL. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2007) ("Mother Nature is not humankind's enemy. Nor is Mother
Nature invariably our friend.. . . Mother Nature simply 'is."').
151. Kate Spinner, Girding Nation for Weather Extremes, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIB.,
Jan. 27, 2012, at BN1.
152. See, e.g., J. Peter Byrne & Jessica Grannis, Coastal Retreat Measures, in THE LAW
OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE 267, 270 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina F. Kuh eds.,
2012).
153. See generally Sun, supra note 9.
154. See Pidot, supra note 22, at 235-36.
155. For general treatments of heuristics, see HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); Amos Tversky &
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such shortcuts occlude thinking about natural disasters and the
risks they pose. First, people often perceive low-probability events
as essentially impossible-even low-probability events with objec-
tively severe consequences like floods or hurricanes-which con-
sequently leads individuals not to plan for them.'5 6 Second, the
"gambler's fallacy"-that is, the belief that a recent unlikely event
is even less likely to recur in the near future"'-leads individuals
and government entities to over-invest in reconstruction in the
wake of a disaster based on a mistaken assumption that a period
of repose and relative safety will follow. Third, the "availability
heuristic"-which causes individuals to estimate the likelihood of
an event transpiring based on the ease with which examples of
similar events come to mind"-may also cause individuals and
policymakers to discount disaster risks. As the memories of a dis-
aster recede in time, they become more difficult to recall, and as a
result, individuals will perceive the risks to be lessened. Another
variant of the availability heuristic may also lead people to tailor
their behavior to that of those around them. When people see
others living and working in areas susceptible to disaster, they
may themselves underestimate concerns regarding safety,"9 and
their complacency may undermotivate government officials to in-
stitute sufficiently responsive policies. Fourth, the "affect heuris-
tic" causes individuals to conflate the risks posed by a decision
with the emotional desirability of that decision.' In other words,
if a particular course of action-buying a house on the beach, for
Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCl. 1124
(1974).
156. See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Neglecting Disaster: Why Don't Peo-
ple Insure Against Large Losses?, 28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 5 (2004); Howard Kunreu-
ther et al., Making Low Probabilities Useful, 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 103, 104 (2001);
Paul Slovic et al., Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Impli-
cations, 44 J. RISK & INS. 237, 254-55 (1977). But see Susan Laury et al., Insurance Deci-
sions for Low-Probability Losses, 39 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17, 18 (2009) (presenting data
from an experiment indicating that "individuals are more likely to purchase insurance for
the higher-consequence, lower-probability events").
157. See Stephen P. Stich & Richard E. Nisbett, Justification and the Psychology of
Human Reasoning, 47 PHIL. OF SCl. 188, 192-93 (1980) (explaining gambler's fallacy); see
also Tristram McPherson, Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism, 3 J. ETHICS & SOC.
PHIL. 1, 20 (2009) ("Ordinary reasoners display robust endorsement of irrational inference
patterns such as the gambler's fallacy . . . .").
158. See Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998) (explaining availability heuristic).
159. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation,
51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 711-13 (1999) (discussing social framing of risk perception).
160. See Melissa L. Finucane et al., The Affect Heuristic in Judgments of Risks and
Benefits, 13 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 1, 2 (2000).
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example-is emotionally appealing, that course of action will be
perceived as safe. And fifth, people over-estimate the danger
posed by human-caused risks in contrast to risks perceived as
natural.'"' In other words, all things being equal, an individual is
likely to believe that the risks of an oil tanker running aground
exceed the risks associated with flooding.
These various cognitive errors "influence policymakers individ-
ually and also shape the public's appetite for regulation."62 As a
result of their operation, natural disaster risk may seem less ur-
gent and less necessary to address than other problems facing the
government. This leads to a regulatory environment that favors
development in hazard-prone areas notwithstanding that such
development is itself in harm's way and, in certain circumstances,
developing areas subject to natural hazards magnifies risks to
nearby property.'
Finally, structural obstacles prevent the effectuation of sound
disaster policy.' Such barriers arise out of the institutional ar-
rangements that make up American government. One such ob-
stacle lies in the vertical relationship between local, state, and
federal governments and the resulting imbalance in incentives
between these governmental entities' respective responsibilities
for disaster policy. 6 ' Local governments primarily regulate land
uses within their boundaries, and therefore serve as the primary
regulator of development in areas subject to natural hazards.16
161. Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 159, at 687-88, 709.
162. Pidot, supra note 22, at 241.
163. Id. at 243.
164. Id. at 222.
165. Id.; see also, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Horizontal Political Externalities: The Supply
and Demand of Disaster Management, 56 DUKE L.J. 101, 104 (2006). Dispersal of authori-
ty across federal, state, and local governments also has substantial ramifications for res-
cue efforts, law enforcement, and humanitarian response in the wake of a natural disas-
ter. See generally Stephen M. Griffin, Stop Federalism Before It Kills Again: Reflections on
Hurricane Katrina, 21 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 527 (2007) (discussing local, state,
and federal responses to Hurricane Katrina).
166. Raymond J. Burby, Hurricane Katrina and the Paradoxes of Government Disaster
Policy: Bringing About Wise Governmental Decisions for Hazardous Areas, 604 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 171, 178-81 (2006); Pidot, supra note 22, at 244-47. The fed-
eral government influences local regulatory decisions with respect to floodplains through
the minimum standards it sets for a community to be eligible for coverage by the National
Flood Insurance Program. See 44 C.F.R. § 60.3(c) (2011) (requiring certain regulatory re-
strictions in designated floodplains); see also U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-
10-631T NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: CONTINUED ACTIONS NEEDED TO
ADDRESS FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL ISSUES 4 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d10631t.pdf (providing background on the National Flood Insurance Program).
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Local governments, however, also have significant financial in-
centives to maximize development within their borders because of
the tax revenue and fees such development generates.'6 7 The fed-
eral government, on the other hand, picks up much of the tab
when natural disasters occur. Following a federal disaster decla-
ration, payments under the Stafford Act reimburse state and lo-
cal governments for 75% or more of the cost of rebuilding public
infrastructure and the Act also provides substantial financial as-
sistance to affected individuals and businesses."' In other words,
local governments reap benefits from allowing risky development
to proceed but incur few costs when such development is damaged
or destroyed by natural disasters.
Another structural dimension of disaster policy arises out of
the horizontal relationship among local governments. "Because
natural boundaries often span political boundaries, the benefits
and costs of one jurisdiction's development policies may be dis-
placed onto neighboring jurisdictions.""' This occurs because
over-development of floodplains, for example, enhances flood risks
downstream. For example, development decisions of Canadian
towns along the headwaters of the Columbia River influence flood
risks experienced downstream in Washington and Oregon."o
The problems created by both vertical and horizontal relation-
ships between government entities may be exacerbated by gov-
ernment capture. As discussed in a previous work:
That is because the cost of bad policy is both broadly distributed (to
federal taxpayers, for example) and unpredictable, while the benefits
of bad policy are highly concentrated in a few highly organized and
well-funded industries. Public choice theory suggests that in such
circumstances, policymakers disproportionately favor the interests of
the few, even if doing so undermines social welfare. This means that
even where ample information about disaster risk exists, there may
be "no politically powerful constituency ready to support legislators
167. See Pidot, supra note 22, at 246-47.
168. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5207 (2006); see also Thomas Frank, 'Disasters' Strain
FEMA's Resources: Rising Use of Federal Relief Depletes Funds for Damage from Large
Storms, USA TODAY, Oct. 24, 2011, at 1A.
169. Pidot, supra note 22, at 250.
170. International rivers like the Columbia have spawned complex treaties to deal with
management issues. See, e.g., Barbara Cosens, Resilience and Law as a Theoretical Back-
drop for Natural Resource Management: Flood Management in the Columbia River Basin,
42 ENvTL. L. 241, 243 (2012).
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and agency officials" advocating for policies to reduce disaster vul-
nerability.
These three categories of obstacles interact and amplify one
another, further impeding policymaking, and the history of disas-
ter policy suggests that efforts to respond to any one obstacle will
likely fail.72 Understanding both the individual and cumulative
effects of these obstacles is necessary to improve the practical ef-
fects of any public policy. The next section considers how these
obstacles may play out in the context of development of oil and
gas infrastructure.
B. Obstacles to Sensible Disaster Policy for Oil and Gas
Infrastructure
Symbolic, cognitive, and structural obstacles lead to too little
regulation of and too much development within hazard-prone ar-
eas like floodplains. These same dynamics infect public policy
surrounding location, design, and operations of oil and gas infra-
structure, including that infrastructure necessary for production,
transportation, and refining. This section considers unique di-
mensions of this economic sector that may bear on the application
of the general theory of overdevelopment explained above.
Symbolic obstacles may influence perceptions of oil and gas
spills caused by flooding, and thereby, the appropriate policy re-
sponses to such events. This may occur, in part, because oil and
gas companies may try to situate themselves within the prevail-
ing cultural understanding of natural disasters as the conse-
quence of nature's actions to shift blame away from themselves.
For example, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina and a one million
gallon spill at one of its refineries in Louisiana, Murphy Oil
claimed that the incident was an act of God to avoid blame, and
171. Pidot, supra note 22, at 252 (footnotes omitted); see also ROBERT R. M. VERCHICK,
FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A POST-KATRINA WORLD 54-56
(2010); Depoorter, supra note 165, at 108-09; Lazarus, supra note 150, at 1045.
172. The National Flood Insurance Program, for example, can be viewed as an effort to
correct misperceptions of risk due to cognitive errors because pricing risk can debias risk
perception. The program has, however, failed to deter development in flood-prone areas
and has a history of systematically mispricing insurance policies. See, e.g., JESSICA
GRANNIS, GEO. CLIMATE CTR., ANALYSIS OF HOW THE FLOOD INSURANCE REFORM ACT OF
2012 (H.R. 4348) MAY AFFECT STATE AND LOCAL ADAPTATION EFFORTS 4-5 (2012), availa-
ble at http://www.georgetownclimate.org/sites/default/files/Analysis%20fo/o20the% 2 0Flo
od%20Insurance%20Reform%2OAct%20ofo/o202012.pdf.
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some local government officials also expressed that sentiment. 173
Similarly, after the 2013 Colorado floods, Tisha Schuller, the
President of the Colorado Oil and Gas Association defended the
oil and gas industry against charges that it was inadequately
prepared for flooding by contending "[i]t was chaos ... [y]ou can't
plan for that. You just have to be flexible and responsive." 4 In so
doing, Schuller did not expressly invoke the metaphor of armed
conflict or imbue nature with independent agency. But her re-
marks distance the industry from any responsibility and do so in
the context where the symbolism of natural disasters was already
present in the public consciousness."'7  Regulators have noted a
significant difference in public attention paid to oil spills caused
by accidents and those caused by natural disasters, and this dif-
ference in attention may result from more general perceptions of
natural disasters. In the wake of Hurricane Sandy, for example, a
spokesperson for the New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection commented that the agency was dealing with "a major
spill ... [and] [o]n a normal basis, we would have had quite a bit
of uproar and media attention.""' Because the spill occurred dur-
ing a severe storm, the public and the media largely neglected the
spill.
Symbolic obstacles to sensible regulation of oil and gas infra-
structure in flood zones may operate with additional force be-
cause energy production is viewed as an important matter of na-
tional security."' Enemies of the United States have recognized
173. John M. Biers, St. Bernard Questions the Costs of Being a Refinery Town, Dow
JONES NEWSWIRES (Dec. 28, 2005), http://global.factiva.com/hp/printsavews.aspx?pp=Print
&hc=All.
174. Mark Jaffe, State to Look at Spill Efforts, DENV. POST, Oct. 6, 2013, at 7K.
175. See, e.g., Charlie Brennan & John Aguilar, Eight Days, 1,000-Year Rain, 100-Year
Flood, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA (Sept. 22, 2013), http://www.dailycamera.cominews/bould
er-flood/ci_24148258/boulder-county-colorado-flood-2013-survival-100-rain-100-year-flood
(explaining that Boulder residents tried to sleep through the night of the flood "while
Mother Nature raged outside"); Bruce Finley, Colorado Flooding: Evacuations, Broken Oil
Pipeline in Weld County, DENV. POST (Sept. 14, 2013), http://www.denverpost.comlenvi
ronment/ci_24095949/colorado-flood-evacuations-broken-oil-pipeline-weld-county (quoting
Weld County Commissioner Barbara Kirkmeyer as saying "[w]e are in round three of
Team Weld County versus mother nature"); John M. Glionna & Jenny Deam, 3 Die in Col-
orado Flooding: Torrential Rain Swells Rivers, Shuts Highways; Governor Declares Disas-
ter, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 13, 2013, at C12 (describing images of the Colorado floods as
"show[ing] a state at the mercy of Mother Nature.").
176. Hutchins, supra note 57.
177. See, e.g., Senator Barack Obama, Remarks at the Governor's Ethanol Coalition,
Energy Security Is National Security (Feb. 28, 2006), available at http://obamaspeeches.
com/054-Energy-Security-is-National-Security-Governors-Ethanol-Coalition-Obama-Speec
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the vital importance of energy and targeted it as a result.78 For
example, Osama bin Laden urged his followers to disrupt the
United States' oil supply because, he claimed, that would "cause
[the United States] to die off.""' Because energy infrastructure
lies in the crosshairs of actual armed enemies of the United
States, it becomes easy to conflate natural disasters that disrupt
energy supply with terrorism.8 o
At the same time, the power of symbolic obstacles may be less-
ened in some circumstances when natural disasters damage or
disrupt oil and gas infrastructure. Society expects more foresight
from large, highly sophisticated economic actors, and may be par-
ticularly willing to assign culpability to energy companies where
risks are recognized. Consider, for example, the rupture of Exx-
onMobil's Silvertip Pipeline along the Yellowstone River.'"' The
rupture occurred during a significant flood event, but nonetheless
responsibility was largely assigned to the company, no doubt in
part because local government officials had expressed concern
about risks on numerous previous occasions."' As a result, the
Silvertip Pipeline spill appears to have been viewed primarily as
an oil spill rather than a flood event.'
Oil companies may also have sufficiently deep pockets to at-
tract litigation by those harmed by oil spills, or natural disasters
more generally, undercutting claims that spills are solely at-
tributable to nature.'8 4 Despite Murphy Oil's attempts to frame oil
spills during Katrina as an act of God, several lawsuits were filed
h.htm.
178. See id. (citing Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden as examples of enemies of America
targeting energy supply).
179. Id.
180. See Venezuela Bolsters Oil Security After Threat, NBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2007), http:
//www.nbcnews.com/id/17149034/#.UuF9HWQo41J.
181. See supra Part I.C.
182. The investigating federal agency concluded that "[t]he risk of flooding on the Yel-
lowstone River was a known threat that could cause the pipe in the river to lose physical
support and potentially rupture." PHMSA NOTICE, supra note 69, at 5.
183. Cf. Kiern, supra note 90, at 9 (noting that the Silvertip Pipeline spill "attracted
only modest media attention and appeared to be handled as a routine response by both the
responsible party and government officials").
184. For example, in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, one lawsuit alleged that oil com-
panies and others contributed to global warming, thereby magnifying the storm and ren-
dering the companies liable for the damage it caused. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585
F.3d 855, 859 (5th Cir. 2009).
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against it and other oil companies."' One of the plaintiffs' lawyers
explained that oil companies were responsible because
[t]heir years of negligence and callous indifference to the marshland
ecology led to Katrina's disastrous consequence. These companies to-
gether destroyed over 100 miles of terra firma.. . and [it's] time now
for a just reckoning of the devastating outcome of their quest for
profits over the safety of the people and destruction of property. 186
The lawyer's comments are, of course, driven by his interest in
succeeding in the underlying lawsuit. Nonetheless, they indicate
a willingness to blame large oil companies for the consequences of
natural disasters that is starkly different than society's ordinary
orientation to the events.
In addition to symbolic obstacles, cognitive obstacles may be at
play, although they may affect the decision-making of large ener-
gy companies less than that of individuals deciding where to live
or operate a small business. The energy sector is dominated by
large, repeat players,' and each individual company has a
broader set of experiences to draw from in assessing risk than in-
dividuals and local government officials. This experience may, to
some extent, counteract cognitive biases that would otherwise re-
sult in skewed perceptions of risk. To put that in the language of
cognitive psychology, a broad set of experiences may dampen the
effects of the availability heuristic because examples will more
easily come to mind.
Where, however, oil and gas companies lease the land of pri-
vate individuals to drill wells, those individual landowners may
lack adequate information or experience to counteract cognitive
processes that discount unlikely, high severity risks.18 This may
lead individual landowners to make economically irrational deci-
185. See, e.g., id.; Turner v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 234 F.R.D. 597, 601 (E.D. La. 2006);
see also Fritz Esker, Hurricane Katrina Fallout Sparks Class-Action Lawsuit Craze, NEW
ORLEANS CITYBUSINESS, Nov. 28, 2005, at 22.
186. Hurricane Katrina Class Action Lawsuit Filed Against Major Oil Companies,
SUSTAINABLEBUSINESS.COM (Sept. 23, 2005), http://www.sustainablebusiness.com/index.
Cfm/go/news.display/id/7253.
187. See Christopher Helman, The World's Biggest Oil Companies, 2013, FORBES (Nov.
17, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2013/11/17/the-worlds-biggest-
oil-companies-2013/.
188. In some circumstances, state law may provide oil and gas companies with tools to
essentially force private owners to enter into leases through pooling rules. See Mark Jaffe,
Colorado Property Owners Faced with Possibility of Being Forced into Drilling Plans,
DENv. POST (Aug. 14, 2011), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_18678240.
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sions to lease land and also resist regulatory efforts that might
disrupt such arrangements. This dynamic is particularly trou-
bling because in the event of an oil or gas spill, the individual
landowner may face more of the consequences than the oil or gas
developer, particularly if the spill results in reduction in the val-
ue of the property.
Finally, structural obstacles operate in this context in much
the way they do with respect to disaster policy generally. Local
governments remain relatively insulated from the costs of recov-
ering from natural disasters, and the potential to become the next
oil and gas boomtown may encourage lax regulatory standards.'
That is not to say that local governments will always embrace oil
and gas development. In recent years, cities and counties across
the country have debated the risks of allowing fracking within
their borders."' These debates, however, rarely focus on risks
from natural disasters, but rather, revolve around concern that
fracking technology can itself lead to environmental contamina-
tion.'92 In this way, the debate over fracking tracks research that
demonstrates that people typically perceive technological risks as
more dangerous than natural risks.'
One difference between the structural dimensions of regulation
of the oil and gas industry and that of other sectors of the econo-
my is that the federal government regulates more extensively in
this arena and could, therefore, play a bigger role in preventing or
189. Terms in the lease may require the oil and gas operator to compensate the land-
owner for any damage caused to the surface. See JOHN B. McFARLAND, CHECKLIST FOR
NEGOTIATING AN OIL AND GAS LEASE 17-18, available at http://www.gdhm.com/imag
es/pdfljbm-ogleasechecklist.pdf (warning that companies "try to get the surface owner to
sign a release, and the release may relieve the oil company from liability for damages that
go beyond those reasonable and necessary for the development of the leased premises")
(last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
190. See Kevin Begos, Fracking for Natural Gas Still Controversial, but Bringing
Windfall of Revenue to Some Rural Areas, OREGONLIVE (Jan. 12, 2014), http://www.oregon
live.com/business/index.ssfl201401/fracking for-natural-gas-still.html.
191. Andrea Iglar, South Fayette Drilling Hearing Postponed, PITT. POST-GAZETTE
(Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.post-gazette.com/locallwest/2014/01/16/Drilling-hearing-post
poned.print; Kristen Wyatt, 3 Front Range Cities Ban Hydraulic Fracturing, DENv. POST
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_24465840/3-front-%20range-cities-ban-
hydraulic-fracturing.
192. See Valerie Richardson, California's Patagonia Jumps into Campaign for Colora-
do Fracking Ban, COLO. OBSERVER (Dec. 12, 2013), http://thecoloradoobserver.com/2013/
12/californias-patagonia-jumps-into-campaign-for-statewide-fracking-ban/.
193. GISELA WACHNIGER & ORTwiN RENN, RISK PERCEPTION AND NATURAL HAZARDS
16-18 (2010), available at http://caphaz-net.org/outcomes-results/capHaz-Net wp3_risk
perception2.pdf.
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controlling development in floodplains. Federal regulations al-
ready include standards for oil and gas pipelines traversing riv-
ers-albeit standards that are the subject of criticism for being
insufficiently protective. 194 Nonetheless, most decisions about the
location of oil and gas infrastructure are made at the state or lo-
cal level.
Contrasting federal and state rules for locating oil and gas in-
frastructure provides some evidence of the importance of struc-
tural obstacles. In the Pinedale Anticline, BLM prohibits devel-
opment within floodplains barring a site-specific determination
that "no physically practical alternative" exists.'" In contrast,
Colorado law identifies oil and gas development as an appropriate
use for floodplains and the state regulatory agency has adopted
no restrictions on such development.19 6 This pattern conforms to
expectations: the federal government faces more of the financial
burden of natural disasters than the state government and,
therefore, would be expected to regulate more protectively. Penn-
sylvania's Act 13 demonstrates, however, that states may be will-
ing to limit development in floodplains in some circumstances,
particularly where industry groups support state regulation as a
means of preempting local zoning control.
The size and economic power of oil and gas companies also pre-
sent the potential for government capture, similar to that ob-
served in other contexts, particularly because the potential con-
sequences of oil spills caused by natural disasters may be
diffuse.' In some circumstances, capture is even more likely be-
cause regulatory agencies are charged with both regulating oil
and gas development and promoting it." While not specifically
addressing disaster risk, this conflict of interest may skew a regu-
latory agency's incentives to develop appropriate regulation of oil
and gas development.
194. Nicas, supra note 33. The federal standard requiring at least four feet of cover be-
tween a pipeline and a river bottom is strikingly small in light of evidence that a single
year of flooding along the Missouri River deepened the river by up to forty-one feet. Id.
195. BLM SEIS FINAL ROD, supra note 119, app. at 4-13.
196. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-65.1-202(2)(a)(I)(A) (2013).
197. See Pidot, supra note 22, at 222, 251-252.
198. See, e.g., James MacPherson, Why Does North Dakota Law Require Top Oil Regu-
lator to Also Promote It?, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2014/01/15/north-dakota-oil-regulator.n_4603720.html.
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Even government agencies that exercise independent judgment
must rely heavily on industry actors to generate information, im-
plement regulatory rules, and respond to spills. The Silvertip
Pipeline spill exemplifies these dynamics. In the wake of the spill,
the administrator for PHMSA explained that "it is incumbent up-
on the operators of [] pipelines to keep vigilant about the amount
of cover that is above their pipeline.""' The administrator further
explained that the agency had asked ExxonMobil itself to investi-
gate the geology of the river and that the agency would consider
that data in approving replacement pipe.200 This demonstrates the
significant degree to which regulators rely on industry itself in
generating information and complying with regulations-a reli-
ance that itself may foster the type of close association between
regulated entity and regulator that proves susceptible to agency
capture.
The Silvertip Pipeline example also underscores the challenge
that government officials face to regulate against a backdrop of
insufficient information. Although local government officials
commissioned a study of the incident and potential risks along
the river, the report could not characterize the risks to specific
pipelines from inadequate cover. As the study explains, "[t]he re-
port does not address [that issue] because detailed information on
location, geometry, depth, method of installation, and condition of
pipelines was limited or unavailable."20' This lack of analysis and
information is particularly troubling because the same report
acknowledges that the limited information available on the condi-
tion of actual pipelines "indicates that many of the pipelines are
buried less than eight feet below the channel bottom. ... [and]
[t]hese pipelines are at risk of exposure during flood events."20 2 In
other words, the report significantly underestimates the risk of
future spills because it did not fully characterize or consider an
important risk factor. Government regulators relying on the re-
port would, then, have skewed-or at least incomplete-
information about risks.
199. House Hearing, supra note 64, at 20. The administrator further noted that "the
operator has an ongoing obligation to continually reassess and assess the risks associated
with its pipline . . . ." Id.; see also Nicas, supra note 33.
200. House Hearing, supra note 64, at 19.
201. YRCDC FINAL REPORT, supra note 62, at 53.
202. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Disaster law is an emerging field of study,20 3 and this article
suggests that important issues arise at the intersection of regula-
tions designed to address disaster risk and those that manage en-
ergy development. To be clear, I do not suggest that oil and gas
development should never occur within floodplains (or other areas
subject to natural hazards). Appropriate building techniques and
technology may reduce risks to acceptable levels-and the energy
industry may have better resources to invest in necessary infra-
structure than some other sectors of the economy. Moreover,
some phases of oil and gas development may require a smaller
footprint than other uses. A significant problem with developing
within floodplains is that such development increases flood risks
elsewhere, and therefore, dedicating floodplains to oil and gas
may be less destructive than using those areas in other ways. An
oil or gas well site may leave more of the floodplain undisturbed
than, for example, building a parking lot or housing develop-
ment.204
But the consequences of natural disasters disrupting energy in-
frastructure are high. Natural disasters can cause energy prices
to spike and create fuel shortages. Disruptions from natural dis-
asters can last lengthy periods of time. Where infrastructure is
damaged, natural disasters risk releasing large quantities of haz-
ardous chemicals into the environment. In other words, when
natural disasters strike energy infrastructure, the resulting dam-
age can well exceed that caused by the destruction of commercial
businesses or residential homes. Paying attention to cognitive,
symbolic, and structural obstacles to effective governance of flood
risks-and natural disaster risks generally-can help illuminate
effective public policy interventions to reduce vulnerability and
avoid environmental and economic harm.
203. See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW & PoLicY 3 (2d ed. 2010).
204. The construction of a parking lot in an area subject to flooding was at issue in the
Supreme Court's famous case Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379 (1994).
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